# **Appendices**

## A Excess points

For the individual task, we define an individual's *excess points* as his received points minus his observed points. For the group task (i.e., part II of the *G-Base*, *G-Charity* and *G-CharityR* treatments), we define excess points as the points received points minus the observed points of a representative group member.<sup>11</sup>

Table A1 detail the mean excess point over Parts I, II and III of each treatment. Focusing on Part II, we find that excess points are significantly higher in the *G-Base* relative to *I-Base* treatments (Mann-Whitney U = 341, p = 0.089). In contrast, we do not find excess points for groups and individuals to be significantly different in Part II of the *Charity* (Mann-Whitney U = 432, p = 0.774) and *CharityR* (Mann-Whitney U = 392, p = 0.376).

The numbers reported in the main text convert these excess points to Euros by multiplying them by 2.

## **B** Additional results

In all regressions, we omit observations from the group treatments (n = 6 in *G-Charity* and n = 3 in *G-CharityR*) where group members fail to coordinate on reporting the same points in Part II.

## **B.1** Die-roll treatments

### B.1.1 Individuals vs. Groups

**Regressions for Result 1.** In Table B1, we use the Logit regression model to study subjects' likelihood of over-reporting in Part II controlling for points observed in Part II, gender and whether they had over-reported in Part I—standard errors clustered at matching group level. The estimates find that subjects in the *Base* treatment are significantly ( $p \le 0.027$ ) more likely to over-report in Part II when they make decisions in a group. In contrast, subjects in the *Charity* ( $p \ge 0.336$ ) and *CharityR* ( $p \ge 0.592$ ) are NOT significantly more likely to over-report when they make decisions in a group.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Subjects always receive the reported points in the individual task. In the group task, subjects only receive the reported points if all coordinated on the same report—otherwise 0 points.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Subjects in the group treatments reported their decisions independently.

Table A1: Mean excess points.

	Base		Cha	ırity	CharityR	
	Ind.	Grp	Ind.	Grp	Ind.	Grp
Part I	1.20 (2.09)	0.98 (1.70)	1.57 (1.96)	1.13 (1.93)	1.13 (1.94)	0.67 (1.63)
Part II	1.07 (1.64)	1.63 (1.73)	1.13 (1.93)	0.90 (2.01)	0.47 (1.20)	0.13 (1.55)
Part III	1.67 (1.73)	1.77 (1.75)	1.63 (1.59)	1.43 (1.76)	0.93 (1.87)	0.90 (1.96)

*Notes.* Each cell details the mean excess points with the standard errors in parentheses. There are 30 observations in each cell of the Individual (*I-Base, I-Charity* and *I-CharityR*) treatments and part II of the Group (*G-Base, G-Charity* and *G-CharityR*) treatments—90 observations in each other cells of the group treatments.

Table B1: Logit model regression estimates: Over-reporting in Part II by subjects in the individual and group treatments.

Dependent Variable	e: Over-re	porting in P	art II					
	Base		Cł	Charity		CharityR		
Regression	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Reference group: Subjects in the individual treatments.								
Group Treatment	1.61** (0.69)	1.63** (0.74)	0.35 (0.59)	0.82 (0.86)	0.06 $(0.62)$	$\underset{(0.74)}{0.40}$		
Over-report (Part I)		1.36** (0.68)		0.58 (0.64)		0.75 (0.61)		
Male		-0.01 (0.59)		1.13 (0.69)		0.17 $(0.46)$		
Points Observed (Part II)		<b>-0.03</b> (0.19)		-1.72*** (0.42)		-0.82*** (0.31)		
Constant	-0.01 (0.42)	-0.24 (0.64)	-0.17 (0.41)	3.55*** (1.13)	-0.69 (0.43)	1.03 (0.87)		
n	96	96	90	90	93	93		
Clusters	48	48	46	46	47	47		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.13	0.01	0.46	0.01	0.20		

*Notes.* We exclude instances where 5 points were observed due to perfect collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the matching group levels.

<sup>\*\*\*, \*\*</sup> and \* denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively.

We find no significant influence of gender ( $p \ge 0.105$ ). Subjects are more likely to over-report in Part II if they had also done so in Part I. However, the effects are only significant in the *Base* treatments (p = 0.047) but not the *Charity* (p = 0.367) and *CharityR* (p = 0.219) treatments. There is a negative correlation between points observed in Part II and over-reporting in Part II. However, the correlation is only significant in the *Charity* (p < 0.001) and *CharityR* (p = 0.004) treatments and not the *Base* (p = 0.873) treatments. This discrepancy seems to be primarily driven by subjects in *G-Base* treatments whose decisions are insensitive to the observed points.<sup>13</sup>

**Regressions for Result 2.** Regressions (1) and (2) of Table B2 show that there are no significant differences in the likelihood of over-reporting between individuals in the *I-Base* treatment and those in the *I-Charity* ( $p \ge 0.753$ ), and between subjects in the *I-Base* treatment and those in the *I-CharityR* treatment ( $p \ge 0.208$ ). We also find no significant differences in the likelihood of over-reporting ( $p \ge 0.338$ ) for individuals in the *I-Charity* and *I-CharityR* treatments. Regressions (3) and (4) of Table B2 show that groups are significantly more likely to over-report in the *G-Base* treatment relative to the *G-Charity* ( $p \le 0.040$ ) and *G-CharityR* ( $p \le 0.001$ ) treatments—no significant differences in the *G-Charity* and *G-CharityR* treatments ( $p \ge 0.185$ ).

**Regressions for Result 3.** In Table B3, we use the Ordered Logit regression model to study the reported points (Part II) by over-reporting groups and individuals. We find no significant differences in the reported points of over-reporting groups and individuals in the *Base* ( $p \ge 0.998$ ) and *CharityR* ( $p \ge 0.853$ ) treatments. In contrast, we find reported points to be significantly lower ( $p \le 0.091$ ) for over-reporting groups relative to individuals in the *Charity* treatments.

## B.1.2 Influence of dishonest members on group's decision.

In Table B4, we use the Logit regression model to study the likelihood of groups over-reporting in Part II controlling for the points observed in Part II and the number of group members who over-report in Part I—we omit the proportion of messages for dishonesty as a covariate as it predicts the outcome perfectly.

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$ We regressed over-reporting in Part II on points observed in Part II for subjects in the *G-Base* treatment. Whilst not significant (p = 0.530), the Logit model estimated coefficient is positive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>We did not control for behaviour in Part I since subjects in the *Base* and *Charity* treatments face different dilemmas. Nevertheless, the conclusion will not change if we also controlled for such behaviour.

Table B2: Logit model regression estimates: Over-reporting in Part II by individuals and groups.

Dependent Variable: Over-reporting in Part II

	Individ	ual treatments	Group treatments					
Regression	(1)	(1) (2)		(4)				
Reference group: Subjects in the <i>Base</i> treatment.								
Charity	-0.16 (0.57)	-0.19 (0.63)	-1.47** (0.69)	-1.69** (0.77)				
CharityR	-0.69 (0.59)	-0.82 (0.65)	<b>-2.23</b> *** (0.70)	-2.57*** (0.79)				
Points observed (Part II)		-0.61*** (0.19)		-0.78*** (0.24)				
Constant	0.01 $(0.40)$	1.55** (0.68)	1.60*** (0.55)	3.94*** (1.01)				
n	72	72	69	69				
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.13	0.13	0.27				
$\chi^2(1)$ : Charity = CharityR	0.78	0.92	1.75	1.58				

Note. We exclude instances where 5 points were observed due to perfect collinearity.

Table B3: Ordered Logit model regression estimates: Reported points in Part II by over-reporting individuals and groups.

Dependent Variable: Reported points in Part II (by individuals or groups)

	Ва	ase	Charity		CharityR	
Regression	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reference group: Subjects in the individual treatments.						
Group Treatment	17.97 (5913.23)	17.92 (5868.03)	<b>-2.03</b> * (1.19)	-2.03* (1.20)	0.11 (0.93)	-0.18 (0.97)
Points Observed (Part II)		0.12 (0.71)		<b>-0.01</b> (0.39)		0.58 (0.45)
n Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	32 0.27	32 0.23	23 0.11	23 0.11	16 0.01	16 0.05

*Notes.* We exclude instances where 4 points were observed due to perfect collinearity.

<sup>\*\*\*, \*\*</sup> and \* denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively.

<sup>\*\*\*, \*\*</sup> and \* denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively.

We find that the number of group members who over-reported in Part I has no significant ( $p \ge 0.293$ ) influence on the group's likelihood over-reporting in Part II for all treatments.

## **B.2** Dictator treatments

There is a strong correlation between the points reported by a group in Part II and the average of the points reported by the group members in Part I (Spearman's  $\rho = 0.755$ ,  $\rho < 0.001$ ). This correlation suggests that selfish members make the group more selfish.

To assess the impact of Part II on behaviour in Part III, we classify subjects depending on whether in Part II they were in a selfish group (GRP-self subjects), in a pro-social group (GRP-pro subjects), or not in a group (IND subjects). We run an ordered logistic regression to look at the impact of being in one of these groups on the points reported in Part III, controlling for the points reported in Part I. The estimates are presented in Table B5. GRP-pro subjects are more likely to give more to the charity than GRP-self subjects in Part III. On the other hand, the reports of GRP-self and GRP-pro subjects are not significantly different from those of IND subjects.

## C Analysis of the chat data

The chat data consists of messages that group members sent to each other in Part II of the experiment. The analysis was performed independently by two student research assistants (RAs). The data was sorted by groups and chat time. The RAs were told that group members could benefit by reporting the same number and that their decisions may or may not affect a local charity. We also included the die roll observed by groups in the *G-Base*, *G-Charity* and *G-CharityR* treatments. The RAs knew there were several treatments but did not know their name and what they were meant to test. They could infer the charity's involvement through the messages exchanged in the chat.

We only use data from groups where all members reported the same number in Part II. This restriction is harmless since, as we report in the main text at the beginning of Section 3.1, almost every group managed to coordinate. Panel A of Table C1 shows that the average number of chat messages per group is broadly similar across the treatments.

The RAs performed two tasks:

Table B4: Logit model regression estimates: Over-reporting in Part II by number of dishonest group members—group treatment only.

Dependent Variable: Over-reporting in Part II (Group treatment) G-Base **G-Charity** G-CharityR 0.91 0.64 0.38 (0.87)(0.79)(0.86)0.09 (0.39) -1.94\*\* -0.93\*\* (0.76)(0.41)

# of group members over-report in Part I Points observed (Part II) 5.00\*\* Constant 0.71 1.51 (1.13)(2.36)(1.09)24 22 23 Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> 0.07 0.54 0.22

*Note.* We exclude instances where 5 points were observed due to perfect collinearity.

Table B5: Ordered logit regression estimates: The spillovers from membership to selfish or pro-social groups in the *Dictator* treatments.

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Dependent Variable: Points reported in Part III.					
Reference group: IND subjects					
GRP-self	-0.33				
CDD	(0.39)				
GRP-pro	-0.54 (0.35)				
Points reported in Part I	1.60***				
	(0.31)				
n	158				
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.28				
$\chi^2(1)$ : GRP-self = GRP-pro	3.89***				

*Notes.* Standard errors clustered at the group level. Constant omitted.

<sup>\*\*\*, \*\*</sup> and \* denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively.

<sup>\*\*\*, \*\*</sup> and \* denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10.

- 1. The first task was to extract from each chat message a **recommended number**. The recommended number is the suggestion made by a group member to the other group members as to which number to report. The RAs left the recommended number blank if the chat message was not suggesting a number or if they were unable to extract a recommended number. If the chat message suggests two or more numbers (e.g., "I prefer 2 or 3"), the RAs were asked to take the average.
- 2. The second task was to *classify* each message into an **argument type**: prosocial, selfish, honest, or dishonest. To do so the RAs were asked to try to infer the motivation behind each message. For example, "we should report the number we saw" would be categorised as honest. The RAs left the argument type blank if they were unable to classify a message.

Panel B of Table C1 shows that around 33% of chat messages were coded by both RAs—the uncoded messages were mostly filler messages such as "Hello", "Shall we use German or English" and "Goodbye". In the treatments involving a die roll the RAs never coded differently recommended numbers; conflicts were also rare in the *Dictator* treatment. This is because the coded chats were often unambiguous about the number to report.

Subjects were less forthcoming about their motivations or justifications for their suggested number. The RAs could only classily about 19% of chat messages in the die-roll treatments, and conflicts occur relative frequently (Panel D of Table C1). The RAs often had to subjectively infer the argument-types from the sequence of chat discussions within the group and the tone of language used.

To see this more clearly, we picked a set of trigger words (English and German) including the terms "honest", "fair", "charity", "kind", "donate", "true", "truth", "right", "lie" and the charity's name. As shown on Panel C of Table C1, only 4–9% of chat messages included at least one of these trigger words.

The proportion of classified argument types by both RA fall to 2% in the dictator treatment. The difference should not be too surprising since unlike the die-roll treatment, there is no natural reference point such as the observed die-roll number in the dictator treatment.

## C.1 Proportion of messages for over-reporting

We converted all recommended numbers coded by the RAs to points for the group (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 points). We only focus on chat messages that are coded by

Table C1: Summary statistics of chat data

		Die roll			
Treatment	G-Base	G-Charity	G-CharityR	G-Dictator	
Panel A: Chat messages.					
Number of Groups	30		29	39	
Number of chat messages	487	444	527	643	
Mean number of messages per group	16.2	15.8	18.1	16.4	
Panel B: Recommended-number coding % of chats coded by at least one RA	by RAs (Tas	k 1). - 56%	47%	50%	
% of chats coded by <i>both</i> RAs	33%	32%	32%	39%	
% of chats coded differently by both RAs	0%	0%	0%	1%	
Panel C: Trigger words identified. <sup>i</sup>					
% of chats with trigger words	4%	5%	9%	9%	
Panel D: Classification of chat messages	into argume	ent-types (Task	2).		
% of chats classified by at least one RA	47%	49%	39%	8%	
% of chats classified by both	23%	20%	17%	2%	
% of chats classified differently by both RAs	6%	6%	5%	0%	

*Note.* <sup>i</sup>: trigger words (English and German) including the terms "honest", "fair", "charity", "kind", "donate", "true", "truth", "right", "lie" and the charity's name.

Table C2: Proportion of over-reporting, exact-reporting and under-reporting messages.

Treatment	G-Base	G-Charity	G-CharityR	G-Dictator
% of over-reporting messages	71%	47%	29%	56%
% of exact-reporting messages	29%	45%	44%	
% of under-reporting messages	0%	8%	27%	44%
n observations	161	143	168	243

*Note.* We only consider chat messages that were assigned a recommended number by both RAs. In *G-Dictator*, over-reporting and under-reporting defined with respect to the mean reported points in Part I (3.5).

both RAs—where there is conflict, we use the highest recommended points. The conclusions hold even if we focus on messages that are coded by at least one RA.

We classify a chat message in the die-roll treatments as for *over-reporting*, *under-reporting* or *exact-reporting*, if the suggested points are above, below, or equal to the observed points

Table C2 details for each treatment the proportion of over-, under- and exact-reporting messages. We see that under-reporting messages never occur in the G-Base treatment and rarely occur in the G-Charity treatment. In contrast, we observe some under-reporting messages in the G-CharityR treatment. All differences are significant (Fischer exact test, all p < 0.01). These chat messages, however, are mainly from a quarter of groups. This suggests that revealing the chat messages to the charity may have a marginal influence on the behaviour of groups. For completeness, we also report the proportion of over- and under- reporting statements in the G-Dictator treatment, defined as chats for which the suggested points are above and below 3.5 points (mean points reported by all individuals in part I of the dictator treatments).

To facilitate comparisons across the die-roll treatments, we therefore focus over-reporting behaviour. To do so, we compute for each group the proportion of coded messages by both RAs that are for over-reporting. For example, a ratio of 0.5 implies that 50% of chat messages in that group which were coded by both RAs are for over-reporting. We performed the analysis of the ratios in the manuscript.

## C.2 Analysis of argument-types

We focus on chat messages which both RAs classified as the same argument-type. Table C3 details the proportion of argument types in each treatment. Here, we see that no messages in the die-roll treatments are classified as dishonest. This can be

Table C3: Proportion of argument-types by treatments.

Treatment	G-Base	G-Charity	G-CharityR	G-Dictator
Pro-social	0%	36%	51%	80%
Selfish	67%	8%	6%	20%
Honest	33%	56%	43%	
Dishonest	0%	0%	0%	
n observations	84	60	62	10

*Note.* We only consider chat messages that were categorised by both RAs.

Table D1: Individual deliberation data.

	Number of	Subjects	Sub	Subjects classified as			
subjects	who wrote	Selfish	Honest				
I-Base	30	26	5	_	_		
<i>I-Charity</i>	30	23	7	6	_		
I-CharityR	30	20	5	5	2		
I-Dictator	41	38	7	6	_		

expected since it would be unusual for subjects to reveal that they prefer to act dishonestly. Also, argument-types in the *G-Base* are either Selfish or Honest.

Introducing the Charity (*G-Charity* vs *G-Base*) leads to significant differences in the argument-types (Fisher exact p < 0.001) with a substantial fall in selfish types and gains in honest as well as pro-social types. Finally, revealing the chat messages to the charity (*G-Charity* vs *G-CharityR*) changes the composition of argument-types, though the differences are not significant (Fisher exact p = 0.272). For completeness, we also report the composition of argument-types in the *G-Dictator* treatment.

## D Analysis of individual deliberations

The individual deliberation data is made of the thoughts subjects typed in Part II of the individual treatments. Table D1 shows for each treatment the number of subjects who wrote anything, and our attempt at classifying their thoughts. Many subjects write at least something, but most subjects simply restate the instructions. As a result, less than half of the subjects' deliberations can be classified into meaningful categories. Looking at the frequencies of the categories, deliberations leaning toward selfish or pro-social preference represent the bulk of the observations.

Table E1: Frequencies of the observed points.

	Part I		Part II		Part III	
	Our	KSS2018	Our	KSS2018	Our	KSS2018
0 points	30%	31%	10%	15%	10%	31%
1 point	10%	08%	10%	23%	20%	15%
2 points	10%	38%	20%	23%	10%	23%
3 points	20%	08%	10%	15%	30%	23%
4 points	10%	00%	30%	23%	10%	00%
5 points	20%	15%	20%	00%	20%	08%
$\chi^{2}(5)$	11.45**		10.60**		11.42**	

*Note.* \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10.

## **E** Details on the experiment

## E.1 Die rolls

We pre-generated 10 sequences of die roll. Table E1 details the frequencies of points observed in our data. We also report the frequencies of points observed in Kocher et al. (2018) data (KSS2018).

## E.2 Instructions to the Base, Charity and CharityR treatments

The experiments were conducted in English. The "general procedures" were printed while the instructions for Parts I, II and III were displayed on the subjects' computer screens. Where relevant, the parts of the instructions that are unique to the Charity and CharityR treatments will be marked as "text". In addition, the instructions that are unique to CharityR treatments will be marked as text. Finally, we will refer to the charity as the XX charity.

### **E.2.1** General procedures

Please switch off your electronic devices and remain silent. Also, do not talk with the other participants. For showing up on time you will receive a participation fee of 4 euros. You may also earn more during the experiment. The experiment consists of 3 parts (Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3). The three parts are independent: choices made in one part do not affect the other parts. At the beginning of each part you will see the detailed instructions for that part on your computer screen. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to

your desk to answer them. During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions. You may also interact with other participants, in which case your own decisions and the decisions of the others may determine your earnings. The onscreen instructions will clearly show whether you interact with other participants. They will also explain how exactly your earnings will be determined.

**Payment.** In some part of the experiment, and depending on your decisions, you will earn points for yourself *or for a charity. We will provide further information about this charity in a minute.* At the end of the experiment, only the points from one of the 3 parts will be used to determine the payment to you *and to the charity.* Your points *and the charity's points* in this part will be converted into euros at the exchange rate of:

$$1 \text{ point} = 2 \text{ Euros}$$

To select the part for payment, the computer will randomly ask one participant to roll a die:

- If the die shows a or □, then points from Part 1 will be used for payment;
- If the die shows a ☑ or ☑, then points from Part 2 will be used for payment;
- If the die shows a 🖸 or 🗓, then points from Part 3 will be used for payment.

After converting points into euros, we will pay you your total earnings—your earnings from the selected part and the participation fee of 4 Euro. No other participant will learn about your earnings and you will not learn about the earnings of others.

We will also pay the charity via online transfer. We will do so from the experimenter room, and you are welcome at this stage to come monitor the payment and verify how much we donate.

**Anonymity.** We will never link your name with the decisions you will make in this experiment. You will not learn the identity of the other participants, and the other participants will not learn your identity. At the end of the experiment we will ask you to sign a receipt to confirm the payments you received and the payments for the charity that are determined by your decisions. We only use this receipt for accounting and it is not linked to your decisions.

**The XX charity** Your decisions during the experiment will affect XX, a local charity based in Nuremberg. In the next few lines, we wish to give you more information about this charity and its goals.

XX is a group of clowns that travel to the hospitals of the Franconian region to visit sick children and brighten their day. They visit children who have been hospitalised for a short time, as well as children who are seriously or chronically ill and in intensive care, oncology, cardiology or dialysis.

The clowns visit the hospitals—Klinikum Nuremberg-Süd, Klinikum Fuerth, and the University Hospital in Erlangen—at least once every two weeks and sometimes every week. During their visit they do not perform a rehearsed program but instead interact spontaneously with each child in their room. They are also in close contact with physicians, nurses, educators and psychologists, in order to adapt their visit to the needs of every children.

At the moment there are 9 clowns in the charity and they are all volunteers. 100% of the donations they receive go directly to their work as clowns in the hospitals. For example, the donations pay for the red noses, the makeup, the transportation costs to the hospitals, the flyers, and the website. XX was founded in 1999 and is recognised by the tax office of Nuremberg as a non-profit organisation particularly worthy of promotion.

As a result of your decisions XX will receive some points. How many exactly will be detailed in the instructions that will appear on your computer screen at the beginning of each Part. At the end of the experiment and before paying you your earnings we will add all the points received by XX and convert them to euros. As explained above we will donate this amount to XX via online transfer.

Before we start the experiment, you will see appear on your computer screen the webpage of XX. We will give you 5 minutes to check their website. It is only in German but you can see the pictures of the clowns in "Wir Clowns" and of their visits in "Clown Nachrichten". At the top of the page you will also find links to their Facebook and Youtube, where you can see more news, pictures, and videos.

#### **E.2.2 Part I**

In Part 1 of the Experiment, you will see a video of a die roll showing  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ , or  $\bigcirc$ . The video you will see is randomly selected by the computer and each of the 6 possible videos is chosen with equal probability.

**Your task.** Your task is to remember the number of the die roll in the video and to type it into a field showing up later. The die number you enter determines YOUR points *and the points for the CHARITY as explained by the table below* (see

Table E2: Points Table in Parts 1, 2 and 3.

Die number entered	<b>.</b> 1	<b>∵</b> 2	<b>∴</b> 3	<b>::</b> 4	<b>∷</b> 5	6
Points for you Points for the charity		2 points 3 points	1		1	1

Table E2). For example, if you enter the die number to be "4", you will receive 4 points and the charity will receive 1 point.

**Comprehension questions.** [Subjects had to correct answers the questions to begin Part 1. The correct answer is underlined.]

- 1. What is your task in this part?
  - To enter the number that you have seen and memorised.
  - To enter a number different from the number you have seen and memorised.
  - To enter an arbitrary number.
- 2a. Suppose that you see a ☑ and enter a "3". How many points will YOU receive? 3 points.
- 2b. *How many points will the CHARITY receive?* 2 points.
- 3a. Suppose that you see a ☑ and enter a "2". How many points will YOU receive? 2 points.
- 3b. *How many points will the CHARITY receive?* 3 points.
- 4a. Suppose that you see a ☑ and enter a "4". How many points will YOU receive? 4 points.
- 4b. How many points will the CHARITY receive? 1 point.

### E.2.3 Part II (individual treatments)

Part 2 of the experiment is similar to Part 1, except that now you have the opportunity to record your thoughts BEFORE making your decision.

In Part 2 of the Experiment, you will see a video of a die roll showing  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$  or  $\bigcirc$ . The video you will see is randomly selected by the computer and each of the 6 possible videos is chosen with equal probability.




Figure E1: How subjects entered their thoughts.

**Your task.** Your task is to remember the number of the die roll in the video and to type it into a field showing up later. The die number you enter determines YOUR points *and the points for the CHARITY as explained by the table below* (see Table E2). For example, if you enter the die number to be "4", you will receive 4 points *and the charity will receive 1 point*. The next screen will describe how you can record your thoughts.

**Comprehension questions.** \*\*remark: Subjects had to correct answers the questions. The questions are exactly the same as in Part I.\*\*

**How you input your thoughts.** You have the possibility to record your thoughts about the number you will enter. You have 5 minutes to write down your thoughts. After 5 minutes the possibility will end. If you have finished before the 5 minutes are over, you can click on the "Leave" button (subjects see Figure E1).

After the experiment we will send a copy of what you wrote to the charity. We are distributing an illustration of the copy for you to check what kind of information we will send to the charity. As you will see, we will send the number you saw, the number you reported, and what you wrote. Note that, since the experiment is anonymous, the copy is anonymous as well: only the participant ID appears and it cannot be traced to you. We will send the transcript to the charity

via email and we will add the email addresses of everyone who participated to today's experiment in blind carbon copy (so they will not see your email address) for you to verify that we are really sending the copy.

## **E.2.4** Part II (group treatments)

Part 2 of the experiment is similar to Part 1, except that now you decide in a group. We will randomly match you with 2 other participants such that you form a group of 3.

In Part 2 of the Experiment, you will see a video of a die roll showing ⊡, ⊡, ⊡, ⊡, ⊡ or Ⅲ. The video you will see is randomly selected by the computer and each of the 6 possible videos is chosen with equal probability. ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR GROUP WILL SEE THE SAME RANDOMLY CHOSEN VIDEO.

**Your task.** Your task is to remember the number of the die roll in the video and to type it into a field showing up later. YOU and the CHARITY will receive points from this task only when all group members enter the same number. In contrast, YOU and the CHARITY will receive 0 points if any group member enters a different number. If all group members enter the same number, the number entered determines the points for YOU and the CHARITY as described by the table below (Table E2). For example, if all group members enter the number 4, then each group member will receive 4 points. In addition, the CHARITY will receive 1 point from each group member (the charity receives a total of  $3\times1=3$  points). If any group member enters a different number, each group member receives 0 points and the charity also receives 0 points from each group member (the charity receives a total of  $3\times0=0$  points). You will be able communicate with the other group members. How you do so will be explained on the next screen.

**Comprehension questions.** \*\*remark: Subjects had to correct answers the questions to proceed. The correct answer is underlined.\*\*

- 1. What is your task in this part?
  - To enter the number that you have seen and memorised.
  - To enter a number different from the number you have seen and memorised.
  - To enter an arbitrary number.
- 2. Suppose that you see a ☑ and enter a "3". The others also enter "3".

- (a) Points YOU receive. 3 points.
- (b) *Points the Charity receives from YOU* 2 points.
- (c) Points the Charity receives from your GROUP 6 points.
- 3. Suppose that you see a ☑ and enter a "2". The others also enter "2".
  - (a) Points YOU receive. 2 points.
  - (b) *Points the Charity receives from YOU* 3 points.
  - (c) Points the Charity receives from your GROUP 9 points.
- 4. Suppose that you see a ☑ and enter a "4". Someone enters "5".
  - (a) Points YOU receive. 0 points.
  - (b) *Points the Charity receives from YOU* 0 points.
  - (c) Points the Charity receives from your GROUP 0 points.

Group interaction. You have the possibility to communicate with the other two group members via a chat box to clarify the number each group member will enter. You have 5 minutes to communicate. The group discussion ends after the 5 minutes or as soon as all 3 members of the group have pressed the "leave chat" button. If only 1 or 2 members of the group press the button, the discussion will continue. The group discussion will only end if all members press the button or if time runs out. If you have pressed the button "leave chat" but you do not want to leave the chat, you can press the button "back". After the group discussion, each member of the group enters a number on the screen.

Generally, the course of communication is up to you. You may chat in any language as long as all group members understand the language. However, you are not allowed to make threats or to agree upon side payments within your group. If you are breaking these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment and you will not receive any payment from the entire experiment.

Within the given time, you can send as many messages to the other group members as you like. The messages you send appear automatically on the screens of your other group members. You cannot send a message to one member in particular.

The screen of the chat will look like this: (subjects see Figure E2) To write a message, click on the purple field, enter your message and press "Enter". Then, your message appears in the grey field above the purple field. You can send as



Figure E2: How subjects chat.

many messages as you want using the same procedure. The other participants will see your message only when you have pressed "Enter".

After the experiment we will send a copy of the chat to the charity. We are distributing an illustration of the copy for you to check what kind of information we will send to the charity. As you will see we will send the number your group saw, the number you reported, and the chat messages you sent. Note that, since the experiment and the chat are anonymous, the copy is anonymous as well: only the participant and group ID appear and these cannot be traced to you. We will send the transcript to the charity via email and we will add the email addresses of everyone who participated to today's experiment in blind carbon copy (so they will not see your email address) for you to verify that we are really sending the copy.

#### E.2.5 Part III

Part 3 of the experiment is the same as Part 1. That is, your task in Part 3 is exactly the same as in Part 1.

In Part 3 of the Experiment, you will see a video of a die roll showing  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ ,  $\bigcirc$ , or  $\bigcirc$ . The video you will see is randomly selected by the computer and each of the 6 possible videos is chosen with equal probability.

**Your task.** Your task is to remember the number of the die roll in the video and to type it into a field showing up later. The die number you enter determines YOUR points *and the points for the CHARITY as explained by the table below* (see Table E2). For example, if you enter the die number to be "4", you will receive 4 points *and the charity will receive 1 point*.

**Comprehension questions.** [Note: Subjects had to correctly answers the questions. The questions are exactly the same as in Part I.]

### **E.3** Instructions to the Dictator treatments

The experiments were conducted in English. Subjects were sent a link to a PDF for the "general procedures". The instructions for Parts I, II and III were displayed on the subjects' screens. We will refer to the charity as the XX charity.

## E.3.1 General procedures

Thank you for participating to this online experiment. Even if it is online, we ask you to treat it as if it was taking place in the laboratory. Please give it your full undivided attention.

For showing up on time you will receive a participation fee of 3 euros. You may also earn more during the experiment.

The experiment consists of 3 parts (Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3). The three parts are independent: choices made in one part do not affect the other parts. At the beginning of each part you will see the detailed instructions for that part on your computer screen. If you have any questions, please contact us on Zoom and we will answer your questions privately.

During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions. You may also interact with other participants, in which case your own decisions and the decisions of the others may determine your earnings. The onscreen instructions will clearly show whether you interact with other participants. They will also explain how exactly your earnings will be determined.

**Payment** In some part of the experiment, and depending on your decisions, you will earn points for yourself or for a charity. We provide further information about this charity below.

At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the three parts. Only the points from the randomly selected part will be used to determine the payment to you and to the charity. Your points and the charity's points in this part will be converted into euros at the exchange rate of:

$$1 \text{ point} = 2 \text{ Euros}$$

After converting points into euros, we will pay you your total earnings—your earnings from the selected part and the participation fee of 3€—via bank transfer. No other participant will learn about your earnings and you will not learn about the earnings of others.

We will pay the charity via online payment immediately at the end of the experiment. We will share our screen on Zoom while we do the payment to allow you to monitor us.

**Anonymity** You will not learn the identity of the other participants, and the other participants will not learn your identity.

To send you your payment, we will ask you to provide your name, your IBAN, and your BIC. This data will be kept separate from the data generated during the experiment. Hence, no one will be able to link your behavior in the experiment to your identity.

**The XX charity** [same text as in the *Base, Charity* and *CharityR* treatment, except that there were links at the end that subjects could click to visit the website and the Facebook page of the charity.]

### E.3.2 Part I

**Your task** You have been allocated 5 points. Your task is to decide how many points you would like to keep for yourself and how many points you would like to give to the charity.

**How you enter your decisions** You will be asked to report a number, which can be either 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.

Your points and the points for the charity The number that you report will determine the points that you will keep for yourself—the remaining points are for the charity.

## **Examples**

- You report the number 3. This means that you will keep 3 points for yourself and give 5-3=2 points to the charity.
- You report the number 5. This means that you will keep 5 points for yourself and give 5-5=0 points to the charity.

**Comprehension questions** [Subjects had to correct answers the questions to begin Part 1. The correct answer is underlined.]

Please answer the following questions.

- 1. Suppose that you reported the number 2. How many points will YOU receive? 2 points
- 2. How many points will the CHARITY receive? 3 points
- 3. Suppose that you reported the number 4. How many points will YOU receive? 4 points
- 4. How many points will the CHARITY receive? 1 points

#### E.3.3 Part II (individual treatment)

**Important!** Part 2 of the experiment is the same as Part 1, except that now you have the opportunity to record your thoughts BEFORE making your decision.

[The remaining of the instructions and the control questions are exactly the same as in Part I]

You will have the possibility to record your thoughts about the number you will enter. You have 5 minutes (300 seconds) to write down your thoughts. After 5 minutes the possibility will end. If you have finished before the 5 minutes are over, you can click on the "Leave" button.

#### **E.3.4** Part II (group treatment)

**Important!** Part 2 of the experiment is similar to Part 1, except that now you decide in a group. We will randomly match you with 2 other participants such that you form a group of 3.

**Your task** Each group member has been allocated 5 points. Your task is to decide how much points each group member should keep, and how much points to give to the charity.

In other words:the number reported by a group member is his/her proposed number of points that he/she would like all groups members to keep—the remaining points are for the charity.

**How you enter your decisions** Each group member will be asked to report a number, which can be either 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.

Your points and the points for the charity YOU and the CHARITY will receive points from this task only when all group members enter the SAME number. In contrast, YOU and the CHARITY will receive 0 points if any group member enters a different number.

In summary:

- If all group members report the same number: each group member will receive the number of points they reported, and the charity will receive the remaining points.
- If all group members do not report the same number: each group member will receive 0 points. The charity will also receive 0 points.

## **Examples**

- All group members report the number 3. This means that each group member will keep 3 points for themselves and give 5-3=2 points to the CHARITY—the charity receives 2+2+2 points from the group.
- All group members report the number 5. This means that each group member will keep 5 points for themselves and give 5-5=0 points to the CHARITY—the charity receives 0+0+0 points from the group.
- All group members do not report the same number. This means that each group member will receive 0 points. The charity will receive 0 points—the charity receives 0+0+0 points from the group.

**You will be able communicate with the other group members.** How you do so will be explained later.

## **Comprehension questions**

- 1. Suppose that you reported the number 2. The other group members also reported the number 2. How many points will YOU receive? 2 points
- 2. How many points will the CHARITY receive from you? 3 points
- 3. How many points will the CHARITY receive in total? 9 points
- 4. Suppose that you reported the number 4. The other group members also reported the number 4. How many points will YOU receive? 4 points
- 5. How many points will the CHARITY receive from you? 1 points
- 6. How many points will the CHARITY receive in total? 3 points
- 7. Suppose that you reported the number 2. Some other group member reports 3 points. How many points will YOU receive? 0 points
- 8. How many points will the CHARITY receive from you? 0 points
- 9. How many points will the CHARITY receive in total? 0 points

**Communication** You have the possibility to communicate with the other two group members via a chat box to clarify the number each group member will enter.

You have 5 minutes (300 seconds) to communicate. The group discussion ends after the 5 minutes or as soon as all 3 members of the group have pressed the "leave chat" button. If only 1 or 2 members of the group press the button, the discussion will continue. The group discussion will only end if all members press the button or if time runs out. If you have pressed the button "leave chat" but you do not want to leave the chat, you can press the button "back". After the group discussion, each member of the group enters a number on the screen.

Generally, the course of communication is up to you. You may chat in any language as long as all group members understand the language. However, you are not allowed to make threats or to agree upon side payments within your group. If you are breaking these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment and you will not receive any payment from the entire experiment.

Within the given time, you can send as many messages to the other group members as you like. The messages you send appear automatically on the screens of your other group members. You cannot send a message to one member in particular.

## E.3.5 Part III

**Important!** Part 3 of the experiment is the same as Part 1. That is, your task in Part 3 is exactly the same as in Part 1.

[The remaining of the instructions was exactly the same as in Part I.]